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Descriptive models of how accidents occur are now commonplace in the aviation industry. These models are useful 
for guiding accident investigation teams and for helping to decide what changes need to be introduced to reduce the 
possibility of further accidents. However, from a psychological point of view, what is still lacking in the field is an 
empirical model that links organizational constructs such as safety climate with individual variables such as stress 
and fatigue and then shows how both of these combine to influence important outcome variables such as workplace 
violations, errors, and willingness to report incidents and near-misses.  
 
The present paper reports on a series of studies conducted within aviation maintenance settings. The first study 
focussed on the link between safety climate, stress, and maintenance errors. The results suggested that safety climate 
does not have a direct effect on errors but has a strong indirect effect via psychological stress experienced by 
individual workers. A second study replicated this finding. A third study extended the model to include workplace 
violations and demonstrated the importance of measuring management attitudes and group norms when assessing 
intention to violate and actual violation behaviours. A fourth study has just been completed that introduced a 
variable labelled as willingness to report.  Sections of the path model that were established in earlier studies received 
further support and a strong link was established between safety climate and willingness to report.  
 
The paper concludes with recommendations as to how these empirical findings can be used to support ongoing 
initiatives in safety training. 
 
Introduction 
 
The increasingly sophisticated error classification 
schemes now in use in the aviation industry recognise 
the multiple causes of error by providing categories 
that capture the role of organizational, social, and 
individual variables. These categories embrace the 
roles of maintainers, operators, supervisors, as well 
as various levels of management (e.g., Shappell & 
Wiegman, 1997). The problem with classification 
schemes, however, is that there is no causal model 
embedded in the schemes to show how the linkages 
within the system operate.  This is not to say that they 
are of no value. Classification schemes, provided 
they are backed by comprehensive investigation 
procedures, are very useful for identifying weak 
points in a system.  What are needed in addition to 
the schemes are empirical models that illustrate how 
the parts of the system work to influence outcomes. 
The present research programme set out to develop 
such a casual model.  The focal point of the 
programme has been maintenance performance in the 
aviation industry and it was within this context that 
the interaction between organizational, social, and 
individual variables was examined. 
 
 
Study 1 (See 1999 ISAP Proceedings) 
 
The first study was designed to explore the role of 
individual and organizational variables in 
maintenance performance in the aviation industry. 
Specifically, the objectives of the study were to: a) 
examine a number of organisational, job and 
individual factors that were considered likely to 
impact on maintenance performance; b) explore the 
relations among these variables; and c) develop a 
model for predicting important work outcome 
variables such as turnover intentions, psychological 
health, and self-reported maintenance errors. 
 
A total of 240 maintenance engineers (232 males) 
working at the two main helicopter repair bases for 
the Australian Army responded to a safety climate  
survey constructed by the author and colleagues. 
Structural equation modeling was used to develop 
and test a model linking organizational and individual 
variables with self-reported maintenance errors and 
turnover intentions. A model which provided a good 
fit to the data is shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1. Explaining maintenance errors using 
workplace variables, morale, and health. 
 
The main features of this model are that: 
• Fit indices were acceptable (e.g., CFI = .99).  
• Workplace variables accounted for 40% of 
the variance in Health. 
• Workplace variables accounted for 58% of 
the variance in Morale. 
• Health was the major predictor of 
maintenance errors, Morale a lesser 
contributor. Neither job intentions nor 
workplace variables exerted a direct 
influence on errors, although workplace 
variables had a significant indirect effect 
through Morale and Health.  
 
Study 2 (See 2001 ASAP Proceedings) 
 
The Fogarty et al. (1999) study provided strong 
empirical support for a model that that is implicit in 
the theories of Reason (1990, 1997) and embedded in 
a number of error taxonomies (e.g., HFACS: 
Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). As such, the study 
represents an important contribution to the literature 
on human error. However, one limitation of the study 
by Fogarty and colleagues was the small number of 
items (4) used to construct the error scale. As the 
main outcome variable, it is essential that work 
continues on the improvement of the measurement 
properties of this key construct. It was also important 
that the structural model developed by Fogarty et al. 
(1999) be tested with a fresh sample of maintenance 
engineers.  
 
Study 2 was essentially a validation study to test four 
hypotheses derived from the Fogarty et al. (1999) 
study. The four hypotheses were:  
 
H1: That organizational factors would contribute 
to individual health. 
H2: That organizational factors would contribute 
to individual morale. 
H3: That organizational factors would not have a 
direct link with errors. 
H4: That individual health and morale would 
have a direct effect on errors.  
The Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) used in 
the first study was modified slightly and administered 
to 104 maintenance engineers working at the same 
Australian Army Aviation bases. The model is shown 
in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Explaining maintenance errors: A 
replication with a more comprehensive error scale 
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The main features of this second model are that: 
• Fit statistics were again within acceptable 
limits. 
• The latent variable, Workplace, is now 
treated as a composite with formative rather 
than reflective indicators (MacCallum & 
Browne, 1993).  
• The model once again showed that although 
workplace variables have a strong influence 
on health and morale of employees, the 
influence of these variables on errors is 
entirely indirect.  
• The drop in variance explained in errors was 
probably due to the fact that this sample of 
maintenance engineers was more restricted, 
consisting mostly of newer recruits who had 
only recently completed basic theoretical 
training.   
 
Taken together, the findings from these two 
studies support the claims of other researchers who 
point to the role that social and organizational factors 
can have on human error (e.g., Reason, 1990). As 
these researchers assert, many errors result from 
interacting causes involving physical, cognitive, 
social, and organizational factors. To understand this 
interaction requires a model of how the components 
of the system work together to influence outcomes. 
We have provided such a model. 
 
Study 3 
 
Within the safety climate approach (see review by 
Flin et al, 2000), a number of researchers have 
attempted to categorise safety climate variables with 
the aim of constructing models to explain the 
interactions among the variables. The most common 
means of categorising variables is to organise them 
according to the level at which the variable exerts 
influence. That is, variables are classified at either the 
organisational, group, or individual level. The 
previous two studies fall into this category with the 
results suggesting that the effect of organisational 
level variables on errors is mediated by individual 
level factors, such as health and stress.  
 
A similar study by Lawton (1998) examined the 
causes of violations among railway shunters working 
in the United Kingdom. Although the outcome 
variable was different in each case (errors versus 
violations), both models showed individual level 
variables mediating the relationship between 
organisational factors and measures of unsafe 
behaviour. Fogarty and Neal (2002) combined these 
two variables in their work on the causes of both 
violations and errors in the construction industry. The 
authors hypothesised that safety climate variables 
would predict violations, whereas individual level 
variables would predict errors. The relations among 
the variables used by Fogarty and Neal are modelled 
in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Predicting violations and errors in the 
construction industry (Fogarty & Neal, 2002). 
As illustrated by the model, safety climate variables 
are seen as impacting directly on violations and the 
personal resources of employees. The employees’ 
resources influence the psychological strain they feel, 
which is directly responsible for the number of errors 
they make. According to Fogarty and Neal, there is 
also a causal link between violations and errors.  
 
Study 3 built upon this earlier work by Fogarty and 
Neal and located it within Ajzen’s (1988) Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB).   
 
The main components of the TPB are a person’s own 
attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural 
control, intentions, and behaviour (Ajzen, 1988). 
Ajzen hypothesised that attitudes often fail to exhibit 
strong correlations with behaviour because of the 
large number of factors that potentially prevent the 
attitude from being converted to behaviour. 
Consequently, Ajzen introduced the concept of 
intention as a link between attitude and behaviour to 
strengthen the relationship. In this way, attitudes can 
be used to predict an individual’s intention to perform 
a behaviour, which in turn can be used to predict the 
occurrence of the actual behaviour. The incorporation 
of intention as a mediating variable has served to 
strengthen the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour in the application of the TPB across a 
variety of settings (e.g., Conner, Warren, Close, & 
Sparks, 1999). The concept of subjective norms is 
more complex. Subjective norms refer to the beliefs 
and behaviours of people who are likely to influence 
the view of the individual. In a work situation, this is 
likely to include both managers and those coworkers 
who are closely associated with the individual. For 
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example, if an employee does not believe that 
management or colleagues are concerned with safety, 
then they are less likely to consider safety as 
important. The third predictor of intention and also a 
direct predictor of behaviour is the component of 
perceived behavioural control. According to Ajzen, 
perceived behavioural control strengthens the 
relationship between intentions and behaviour. Ajzen 
argued that people often intend to perform certain 
behaviours, yet fail because of factors which fall 
outside their control.  
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Figure 4. Direct and mediated pathways to violation 
behaviours in aviation maintenance. 
 
To a large extent, the constructs included in the TPB 
mirror the individual, group, and organisational level 
variables measured by Fogarty and Neal (2002) in 
their study of violations in the construction industry.  
Consequently, it was felt that the TPB could be used 
to provide a theoretical foundation for the prediction 
of violations in aviation maintenance. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that management attitudes would 
exert an indirect influence on violation behaviour via 
own attitudes, group norms, and perceived control. 
We also hypothesised that group norms would  have a 
direct effect on own attitudes.  
 
Some components of the MES from the earlier 
studies were included in the survey but, for the most 
part, the scales were new and developed for the 
purpose of this study. Factorial validity and reliability 
estimates were checked using SPSS. All scales were 
satisfactory. 
 
The main findings from this model are that:  
• Management attitudes have an effect – either 
directly or indirectly - on all other variables 
in the model.   • Group norms affect individual attitudes, 
workplace stressors, intention to violate, and 
actual violations.  
Participants in  Study 3 included 312 aircraft 
maintenance personnel from the Australian Army (N 
= 105), Navy (N = 86), and Air Force (N = 116), plus 
6 civilian maintainers. The majority of the 
participants were aircraft maintainers (52%) or 
avionics maintainers (39%), while the remaining nine 
percent were involved in other maintenance support 
roles. The survey was distributed by staff working for 
the Directorate of Flying Safety and returned to the 
author for analysis. It is not certain exactly how the 
sample was chosen but these figures represent less 
than 20% of the total population of maintainers in the 
three branches of the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF).  
• Workplace stress is not strongly associated 
with intention to violate and is not linked at 
all with actual violations when these other 
variables are included in the model.  
 
The introduction of Ajzen’s TPB model helped to 
identify variables relevant to the prediction of 
violation behaviour, however the model does not 
cover errors, one of the key outcome variables in this 
programme of study, so the author reverted to the 
safety climate approach to develop a more extensive 
model linking errors, violations, and reporting 
behaviour. This work is described in Study 4. 
 
Amos 4.01 (Arbuckle, 1999) was used to test the fit 
of the path model shown in Figure 4 to the covariance 
matrix generated from the safety climate variables.  
 
Study 4 
  
The three previous studies had all focused on 
explaining errors and violations. However, another 
key variable in aviation safety is the need to report 
violations and errors so that a comprehensive 
database on types of error/violation and their 
 
Errors, Violations, and Reporting Behavior in Aviation Maintenance                                     5 
 associated causes can be compiled for system design 
and training purposes. The ADF has a well-
established and well-promoted incident reporting 
system but is aware that many personnel do not use 
the reporting system at all. It was the author’s view 
that some of the reasons for non-use can be found 
among the safety climate variables used in earlier 
studies. Accordingly, the last study in this series was 
designed to integrate a variable called reporting 
behaviour into the model already developed in 
previous studies. For this purpose, a revised safety 
climate scale was developed and administered to 178 
maintenance personnel responsible for servicing the 
Army Aviation helicopter fleet.  
The model shows that the organizational factors 
measured by the survey have a direct effect on the 
workplace environment and violations. The arrows 
indicate the direction of the effect. Workplace 
environment, in turn, has a direct effect on the 
stressors experienced by individual workers. 
Violations and individual health (which translates to 
strain in the present study) also have an effect on 
Errors.  
 
As far as tendency to report is concerned, the 
expected links with errors and violations were noted 
(one has to make an error before one can report it). 
Organizational factors affected tendency to report, 
confirming that employees were more likely to report 
mistakes in situations where management is 
communicative, open, and committed to safety 
values.  
 
Results are summarised in Figure 5. Note that this 
model has been simplified for publication purposes 
and that the actual model contained both 
measurement and structural components.  A brief 
description of the measurement components is given 
in the next paragraph. 
 
R-square values were high for both the violations 
(62%) and errors (74%) outcome variables, reflecting 
the work that has already gone into determining the 
precursors to these behaviors in the earlier studies 
reported here. R-square for reporting behavior should 
improve as we get a better understanding of the 
motivators for this type of behavior.  
 
The organisational factors variable was measured by 
five scales: supervision, commitment, 
communication, management support, and training. 
Workplace was a much narrower variable than in 
previous studies, comprising documentation 
(manuals, workcards, etc) and adequacy of resources. 
The stressors variable was measured by a range of 
items covering such issues as time pressures and 
work overload. All other variables in the path 
diagram shown in Figure 5 were formed from 
multiple-item aggregate scales.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are many examples of safety climate surveys in 
the literature. When used in organizational settings, 
such surveys will demonstrate that short-cuts and 
work-arounds do occur in maintenance work and that 
supervisors and managers are aware of these 
deviations from set procedures. There are 
undoubtedly practical reasons (e.g., time pressures) 
for these short-cuts but statistical analyses of data 
collected from surveys such as the ones used in the 
present research programme repeatedly show that 
there are reliable links among violations and errors 
(e.g., Fogarty, Saunders, & Collyer, 1999, 2001) and 
organizational and individual variables.  
Organizational Factors
Workplace (60%)
Stressors (35%)
Reporting (24%)
Violations (62%)
Errors (74%)
Health (22%)
 
 
These findings support the claims of other researchers 
who point to the role that social and organizational 
factors can have on human error (e.g., Reason, 1990). 
As these researchers assert, many errors result from 
interacting causes involving physical, cognitive, 
social, and organizational factors. To understand this 
interaction requires a model of how the components 
of the system work together to influence outcomes. 
We have provided such a model.  Figure 5. Direct and mediated pathways to violation 
behaviours, errors, and reporting behaviour in 
aviation maintenance 
The first version of the model focused on the 
explanation of variance in self-reported errors. 
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Subsequent extensions of  the model included other 
crucial safety outcomes such as violations and 
tendency to report safety incidents. The various 
models are conceptually driven and repeatedly 
validated on different datasets.  
 
Continuing education is needed to improve awareness 
of these causal links. It will never be possible to 
completely eradicate errors, violations, or to achieve 
complete reporting of workplace incidents, but the 
process of validating influential but essentially 
descriptive models of safety behaviour will help to 
bring about attitude change at all levels of an 
organisation. 
 
Where to from here? 
 
Safety climate measures such as the ones used in 
these studies are very useful but they should be 
standardised so that the items and scales are basically 
the same across administrations, thus permitting the 
establishment of benchmarks on the various scales 
(Flin et al, 2000). We have not yet reached the point 
where we can standardise. The focus of the research 
up to this point has been the identification of key 
safety outcomes and defining the network of 
relationships among these variables and background 
climate variables. The next step will be to put 
together an instrument that is short enough for 
practical use but comprehensive enough to capture 
the constructs outlined in this paper. 
 
A related aim is to link self-report measures with 
actual performance outcomes, rather than simply 
using self-report as the basis of measurement 
operations. The low base rates of incidents and errors 
suggests that this research will involve higher level 
modeling, but it is my expectation that the models 
developed to this point will prove useful in 
explaining safety data, whatever form it takes.  
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